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In his book States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and 
Control, Jeffrey Herbst describes the conflicts between the Zulu and early 
Dutch settlers over their opposing conceptions of sovereignty over territory 
and people. The Zulu believed that their political authority extended wherever 
people had pledged obedience to their king regardless of the territory where 
they happened to be. Also, ‘the Zulu believed that they could let the whites 
settle on land without giving up ownership’, whereas for the European whites, 
occupation over a certain territory also meant the ownership of that territory 
and control of the people that happened to be there (2000: 40–41). Extrapolated 
from its colonial context in which the Dutch colonizers wanted to absolutely 
dominate the colonized and take their land, the story could be interpreted 
as a clash between the conception of a political community based on ethnic, 
cultural, hereditary or maybe also declaratory loyalty and solidarity, regardless 
of existing political boundaries and polities in which the members of this 
community live, and a political community based on loyalty to the authorities 
governing a territory where one lives and, ideally, on solidarity with all those 
who happen to be on that territory under the same authorities. Modern states 
in reality often combine these two principles in a particular way: they often 
claim that their citizens or their ethnic kin abroad are bound to their polity 
and thus expect a loyalty and sometimes exercise an influence on diaspora 
members (who, in turn, are often interested in meddling in political affairs of 
the ‘old country’), but, internally, they always insist on undivided loyalty of the 
population they govern. Even further from its original South African situation, 
the clash between what we can generally call civic and ethnic solidarity, as 
well as different understandings of whom should be loyal to whom and who 
belonged together, turned crucial during the last years of Yugoslavia and decisive 
at the moment when the multi-party majority democracy was introduced in its 
republics.
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Democracy and nationalism
In socialist multinational federations, Bunce argues, ‘the very concept of 
citizenship […] became dual’ (1999: 49). On the one hand, according to her 
it implied membership in the ideological-political community attached to the 
‘socialist regime-state’, and, on the other, membership in a national community. 
Nevertheless this notion of the duality of citizenship in socialist federations 
needs to be refined. This was the case in the USSR and in Czechoslovakia 
(before 1969). But in both Yugoslavia after 1945 and Czechoslovakia after 
1969, membership in the ‘ideological-political community’ was bifurcated 
into federal-level and republican-level membership. Therefore, citizenship 
became not only formally dual but triadic: on the one hand, there was a dual 
legal citizenship – federal and republic-level citizenship – and, on the other, 
membership in a given ethnonational community; with no obligation, at 
least in the Yugoslav case, to declare ethnic belonging and with the option 
of even declaring Yugoslav ‘ethnicity’. Since one of the crucial tasks of post-
communist democratization consisted in ‘identifying the community in 
which democratic rights and responsibilities are to be vested’ (Skalnik Leff 
1999: 205), democratic participation and political belonging clashed in 
Yugoslavia at the junction of Yugoslav citizenship, republican citizenship and 
ethnic membership.
One way of understanding Yugoslavia’s initial democratization – a 
democratization that eventually exacerbated inter-ethnic conflicts which 
had been meticulously nurtured and controlled by those nationalist elites 
who were attempting to, by multi-party elections, accede to power or stay 
in power – is to examine furthermore the nature of Yugoslavia’s confederal 
citizenship. As described in the preceding chapters, Yugoslav citizenship 
was not only legally ambiguous but was becoming politically less important 
owing to the progressive confederalization of Yugoslavia since the mid-
1960s. Hence, given that political decision-making had been taking place at 
the republican level and that the federal level mostly served – since the early 
1970s – as a platform for inter-republican, or almost inter-state bargaining, 
democracy could only have been introduced from the bottom-up, from the 
republics themselves as clearly identified ‘communities’. In the Yugoslav 
case, the problem was that democratization occurred only at the ‘bottom’ 
without ever reaching the ‘top’. Since Yugoslavia was de facto a confederation, 
republican citizenship was the natural answer to the question of how and 
where democracy should be exercised. After the break-up of the LCY, the 
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republican elites did not hesitate to call for democratic elections only at the 
republican level in order to legitimize their power and, having attained a 
democratic mandate, proceeded to negotiate Yugoslavia’s future.
In the confusing situation surrounding the introduction of liberal 
democracy in the Yugoslav republics, an ordinary citizen was obliged initially 
to play three mutually non-exclusive roles. First, he or she was invited to vote 
as a citizen and/or resident of his or her republic and to express his or her 
political preferences through multi-party republican elections. At the same 
time, nationalist elites and politicians targeted him or her as a member of their 
ethnic group, a group that usually stretched across republican boundaries. 
And, finally, during this whole period he or she was still a citizen of Yugoslavia 
where there were still functioning federal institutions in place, including the 
Yugoslav People’s army and he or she was recognized in the international arena 
uniquely as Yugoslav. These three identities remained compatible only so long 
as citizens could perform all of them simultaneously, in other words, only 
insofar as the Federation provided a solid framework within which Yugoslavs 
could be at the same time members of their civic (republican) people, their 
ethnic nation and remain in a position of mutual loyalty, unity and solidarity 
within the general Yugoslav ‘community of citizens’.
However, the progressive disappearance and the weakening of the federal 
framework immediately caused severe difficulties for those living in a republic 
that was not dominated numerically by their ethnic group. When it became 
distinctly possible that Yugoslav federal protection would be lost along with the 
dissolution of the supra-republican and supranational community of citizens, 
they realized that they would simultaneously acquire an unwanted status 
of ethnic minority in a new state and lose any supra-republican institutional 
protection and connection with their kin-state and other members of their 
ethnic nation. This created an atmosphere of mutual suspicion among groups 
as well as – in the context of Yugoslavia’s imminent dissolution – an urgent need 
to establish new states – preferably ethnically homogeneous and territorially 
enlarged – that would guarantee to their future citizens their full equality and 
democratic rights as well as protection. It became increasingly clear that the 
creation of such states in the context of conflicting territorial claims could not 
be achieved without violence.
Consequently, the debate on the sovereignty of nations and of republics 
turned into a debate about membership and a given citizen’s loyalty to democratic 
states about to be created on the basis of Yugoslavia’s internal organization. 
Slobodan Milošević’s double measure is instructive here. In a nutshell, when it 
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comes to Serbia, only republics are sovereign and unitary. By contrast, when it 
comes to other republics, the badge of sovereignty belongs to ethnic nations. It is 
not surprising then that Serbia contradicted the principle of ethnic sovereignty 
and solidarity in its new constitution adopted in September 1990. Serbia defined 
itself as the ‘state of its citizens’, therefore as civic and republican – strategically 
a wise move if we compare it to Croatia’s constitutional self-definition as 
an exclusively ethnic Croat state. It also meant that no internal secession is 
possible in a civically bound community of citizens of Serbia that as such at 
least rhetorically guaranteed all rights to all citizens, which also legitimized 
the reduction of regional autonomies. At the same time, Serbia insisted on the 
sovereignty of ethnic groups, portrayed itself as the protector of Serbs in Bosnia 
and Croatia and demanded their separation from the seceding republics and, 
preferably, their union with a constitutionally civic Serbia!
Federalism formally creates a national demos at the national level and 
subnational demoi at the regional level. However, in mono-national and 
monolingual federations this necessary product of every federal system does not 
entail parallel and often competing nation-building projects at the sub-federal 
level that could result in distinct national demoi living under the same federal 
roof. In multinational federations nations are usually organized territorially. 
The federal identity and membership is thus in constant competition with 
the ethnonational sub-federal identities and memberships. Centrifugal and 
centripetal forces continually oppose one another and the equilibrium depends, 
among other things, on the institutional setting in place, historical legacies 
and experiences, citizens’ perceptions and use of the dual nature of their 
citizenship, the interaction between their multi-level citizenship status, legally 
codified or not, and their ethnocultural membership and also on the practical 
solutions to political and economic disputes and crises taken by regional and 
federal political elites. The socialist policies in Yugoslavia worked towards the 
disabling of the federal Yugoslav demos in favour of sub-federal demoi that 
should have had a civic component, although difficult to uphold in the context 
of ethnic imbalances. Only Bosnia corresponded to this ideal of civic republican 
citizenship that acknowledged informally its multiethnic composition as well as 
its high degree of inter-ethnic mixing.
Nonetheless, the introduction of liberal democracy offered, perhaps, the last 
opportunity for creating a Yugoslav demos through the means of representative 
democracy had the rules of the electoral game been different. Some observers 
believe that a majority vote at supranational level would have created such a 
demos (Jović 2001a: 30). Linz and Stepan (2001 [1992]) also argue that the initial 
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democratic elections should have been organized at the federal level (see below). 
According to these authors, this would have legitimated the federation and 
reinforced federal citizenship. However, the experience of Czechoslovakia – where 
the first elections were organized simultaneously at both federal and republican 
level – demonstrates that this was not a safe bet either.
It is interesting to note that at a certain point it was Milošević who proposed 
nationwide elections, hoping to capitalize on his position as the leader not 
only of Serbia but of all the Serbs and so of Yugoslavia’s most numerous nation 
(see Jović 2001a). He was obviously interested in profiting from the double 
role he played as both Serbian nationalist and the ‘saviour’ of a multinational 
Yugoslavia – rhetoric that, at least initially, had a certain appeal even for some 
non-Serbs and many non-nationalist Serbs as well. This initiative, however, 
stoked fears of the kind of ethnic imbalances characteristic of multinational 
polities. Obviously, the classic model of representative democracy (one citizen – 
one vote) at the supranational level would never have been acceptable for 
smaller nations (Slovenes, Croatians, Bosniaks, Albanians and Macedonians). 
Only Serbs and Montenegrins were interested in this kind of power sharing, but 
only to a certain extent. All Serbs and Montenegrins taken together were still in 
a minority position in Yugoslavia as a whole and thus were fearful of a potential 
‘anti-Serb’ coalition. In the absence of an institutional counterweight that could 
have guaranteed separate national/republican interests, the idea eventually 
turned out to be unacceptable for everyone. The first democratic elections 
made federal citizenship politically redundant. It was de jure existing but only 
as a derivative: democratization laid bare its true confederal nature. From these 
elections organized between early Spring 1990 and late Autumn of 1990 to the 
final disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1992, federal citizenship was only relevant 
if citizens travelled or fled abroad and was thus limited to passports, which were 
themselves issued by the republics.
The moment the Yugoslav leadership decided to introduce liberal democracy 
and organize multi-party elections, a certain number of questions immediately 
arose, the answers to which would critically determine future events. Let us just 
enumerate the most pressing questions that anyone wishing to play the game of 
liberal democracy – especially if the game is played in a democratizing socialist 
multinational (con)federation – must tackle head on: what is the institutional 
and territorial framework for democracy or, in other words, where exactly, for 
whom and by whom, is liberal democracy to be introduced? In the Yugoslav 
case, is it in the Federation, in the republics or, maybe, in the ethnic groups? 
Democracy should be the rule of people by the people, but who is ‘the people’ 
Nations and Citizens in Yugoslavia and the Post-Yugoslav States108
in Yugoslavia? Is it the citizens of Yugoslavia? Citizens of Yugoslav republics? 
Members of constitutive nations? Or, perhaps, ‘the working class and all working 
people’, as stated in the existing Constitution? If a citizen is asked to perform 
his or her duty, to elect and be elected, now in multi-party elections as opposed 
to his or her previous socialist experience with elections at the commune level 
and delegate system, and to take a part at a new emerging agora, then where 
is this agora and who are his or her co-citizens? And since every agora has its 
limits, who will be excluded? If elections are to be called, where should he or 
she cast their vote and for whom can they vote? Since representative democracy 
usually entails majority rule, who is likely to be in the majority and who in the 
minority? And what relationship should be built between these two camps, the 
tyranny of the majority or consociational cooperation? After all, who is sovereign 
in Yugoslavia or, in other words, who is capable of making and implementing 
political decisions?
Indeed, the question of sovereignty was immediately posed, coupled with the 
unavoidable issue of the right to self-determination. Confusing definitions of 
Yugoslav sovereignty – contained both in its various constitutions and in the 
speeches of its leaders – did not make the task easy for Yugoslavs and turned 
the process of democratization itself into an open constitution making and 
thus heavily contested process. Suddenly, the previous rules were open for 
debate and, unsurprisingly in an atmosphere of complete liberalization, many 
had different, opposing and often mutually exclusive visions of the future.
The 1974 Constitution declares in its first article that Yugoslavia is ‘based 
on the power and self-management of the working class and all working people’. 
The working class is complemented with ‘all working people’ (thus those outside 
the leading class as well) as the bearer of sovereign power. Since this alliance of 
working people is almost all-encompassing when it comes to working adults 
in Yugoslavia, could we read it simply as the ‘people’, and, furthermore, as the 
Yugoslav people? But, alas, this interpretation would have been contrary to the 
Yugoslav solution to the national question, a solution that gave all sovereignty 
and the right of self-determination to the constituent nations. By this reasoning, 
and in the context of the introduction of liberal democracy, i.e. voluntary 
abandonment of the socialist heritage by that very socialist elite in power and at 
the moment when the de-legitimization of socialist heritage was in full swing, 
‘the working class and all working people’ and, more generally, the Yugoslav 
people as such were excluded as potential bearers of sovereignty. With self-
management rejected and put in question as an economic and political model, it 
was hard to imagine how the working class and the working people could have 
constituted themselves as major political subjects.
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Therefore, Yugoslavs essentially faced two alternatives as to who (or what) 
could be sovereign: ethnic nations or the republics and their citizens? Serbia 
and Serbia’s junior partner Montenegro argued that the former was sovereign; 
all other republics insisted on the latter. Furthermore, the question was related 
to the even more explosive issue of the constitutionally guaranteed right to self-
determination and secession. Into this volatile debate, Milošević launched an 
argument that resonated heavily among ethnic Serbs. It could be summarized 
as follows: if the republics have the right to secede from Yugoslavia, then ethnic 
Serbs as a whole have the same right to secede from everybody else (see Budding 
2008: 92; also Dimitrijević 1995: 58).
Milošević used the sovereignty of ethnic nations argument against Slovenia, 
Croatia and Bosnia, but he insisted on it only when it concerned ethnic Serbs 
outside Serbia. However, at the same time Serbia expected loyalty from all of its 
citizens, despite the fact that up to 35 per cent of them were not ethnically Serbs. 
The Serbian leadership was not ready to apply the ethnic principle within Serbia 
and acknowledge an equivalent right of secession for ethnic Albanians in Kosovo 
and Magyars in Vojvodina (as ‘national minorities’ they were not seen as bearers 
of the right to self-determination), or ethnic Muslims in the Sandžak (who due 
to smaller number and the lack of separatism were not seen as threatening). 
The sovereignty of ethnic nations, regardless of actual administrative divisions, 
was unacceptable as a principle of Yugoslavia’s disintegration both to the other 
republics and, later, to the international community. The general principle of the 
disintegration of socialist federations was – until the recent Western recognition 
of Kosovo’s independence and Russia’s recognition of Georgia’s breakaway 
provinces – anchored in respect for their internal republican borders.
But what would the final result of the extreme application of ethnic sovereignty 
in Yugoslavia have been? Most probably Slovenia would have remained in its 
present shape alongside a series of strange state creatures: a Croatia without at 
least 20 per cent of its territory but with Western Herzegovina and tiny parts of 
Bosnia; a Greater Serbia with Serb-populated Croatian and Bosnian territories, 
possibly with Montenegro, but without Kosovo, Serbian and Montenegrin 
Sandžak and parts of Vojvodina; a Greater Albania with Kosovo and Western 
Macedonia attached, a smaller Macedonia; and, finally, an ethnic Muslim 
state comprising the patchwork of Bosnian territories and most of the Serbian 
and Montenegrin Sandžak. Faced with the choice of breaking up Yugoslavia 
along either republican or ethnic lines, nationalist politicians in Yugoslavia 
opted for a combination of the two in accordance with their interests at the 
time. Hence, Milošević’s Serbia insisted on the inviolability of its own borders 
but demanded control over Montenegro and the Serb majority territories in 
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Bosnia and Croatia. Similarly, Tudjman’s Croatia insisted on a republican 
form of sovereignty – though interpreted as the sovereignty of ethnic Croats – 
inviolability of its republican ‘AVNOJ’ borders, and on the right to secede from 
Yugoslavia, but nevertheless challenged Bosnian sovereignty in and sometimes 
beyond Croat-populated areas.
Citizens as voters: Democratize and divide
In socialist Yugoslavia, there was, constitutionally, no minority and no majority, 
but only equal nations and nationalities. The old federal framework made it, 
therefore, possible for any individual to move to another ‘ethnic’ republic 
Figure 6.1 Ethnic map of Yugoslavia in 1991 (Source: Wikimedia Commons).
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without becoming a minority member in that republic; the common citizenship 
guaranteed equal rights throughout Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, demographic data, 
including ethnic group membership, competing percentages and the territorial 
distribution of these groups became a major concern at the end of the ancien 
régime (Stokes 2013). In a multiethnic state, the transition from self-management 
socialism, implying in principle widespread democratic decision-making at the 
workplace level and the no-majority-no-minority rule, to a liberal democracy 
formed exclusively around political parties and where everything hinges on 
the constitution of the majority and minority easily created turbulences and 
highlighted inter-ethnic competition. Many citizens were suddenly placed before 
the choice of being a member of a minority in a large state or being in the majority 
in a smaller one. Vladimir Gligorov’s famous aphorism captures the nature of 
ethnic rivalry in the Balkans: ‘Why should I be a minority in your country when 
you can be a minority in my country?’ The principle of majority rule at the federal 
level was rejected for the above-mentioned reasons – ultimately no one would 
have a majority – but the majority principle was applied within the republics and 
that inevitably created a ‘fear of becoming a minority’ (Jović 2001a).
Rogers Brubaker reveals the striking historic parallels between the post-
First World War context and the post-communist situation regarding the 
triadic relation between national minorities, nationalizing states and national 
homelands (1996). There was an internal triadic relation between ethnocentric 
republics, ethnic minorities and external homelands (republics). The federal 
centre was a strong guarantor of the equality of all groups and was therefore a 
necessary counterweight to ethnic imbalances in the republics. Nevertheless, 
the internal ‘triadic configuration’ was occasionally discussed – as testified 
by the debates on the position of Croatian Serbs during the Croatian Spring 
movement – but the federal roof and all the rights attached to federal citizenship 
made the question of borders, ethnic republics, national homelands and ethnic 
minorities politically less salient.
Early democratization in ethnically diverse societies can easily lead ‘from 
voting to violence’ (Snyder 2000). ‘Naively pressuring ethnically divided 
authoritarian states to hold instant elections, argues Jack Snyder, can lead to 
disastrous results’ (2000: 16). In ethnically diverse societies, democratization 
more often divides than unites. As Michael Mann warns in his book The Dark 
Side of Democracy, ‘democracy has always carried with it a possibility that the 
majority might tyrannize minorities, and this possibility carries more ominous 
consequences in certain types of multiethnic environments’ (2005: 2). This does 
not mean that ethnic diversity must ineluctably lead to a failed or conflictual 
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democratization. However, it does suggest that pushing for a rapid introduction 
of classic democratic rules in a context where ethnic differences can be used 
for political mobilization – and then legitimized and reinforced through 
the popular vote – will more often than not contribute to and cement ethnic 
fragmentation. In the former socialist federations that were mostly divided 
into ethnonational territories, the lines of fragmentation were already clearly 
demarcated. Moreover, since citizens often declared their ethnic belonging 
in addition to their republican identity – as a rule in the USSR and less so in 
Yugoslavia – ethnonational lines of fragmentation were already present within 
republican societies as well. Katherine Verdery observes that
Western purveyors of ‘democracy’ (etymologically, ‘rule by the people’) therefore 
brought it into an environment predisposed to ethnicize it. As external observers 
came to ratify that elections were free and fair, they failed to ask who ‘the people’ 
were who would be allowed into the social contract creating citizens and rights. 
(1998: 297)
As in many other post-communist countries, the first democratic elections 
in Yugoslavia demonstrated the ‘ethno-national cartelization of opinion and 
electoral competition’ (Skalnik Leff 1999: 214). Civic membership was soon 
eclipsed by ethnic belonging as the most important marker of a citizen’s identity. 
Vojin Dimitrijević describes the mechanism of ethnic identification:
individuals are pushed not to act primarily as citizens but as members of 
the ethnic group. They are induced not to recognise any social, economic, 
professional and other interests and to behave as if all members of the ethnic 
group were in the same social position. (1998: 147–154)
To illustrate the rejection of civic identity – by a great number of individuals but 
not by everyone! – Dimitrijević quotes Miroslav Toholj, one of the leaders of 
Bosnian Serbs: ‘Serbs have been finally deprived of their Serb name, they have 
been made citizens, which they will not accept.’ Toholj here basically describes a 
certain conception of citizenship which is based on political community brought 
together by ‘blood’ and ethnoreligious belonging as opposed to ‘citizens’ brought 
together only by neutral civic status. Thus becoming ‘citizens’, i.e. accepting 
the legal fact as the basis for political community was seen as superseding or 
potentially subjugating ethnic groups. Unsurprisingly, Serb nationalists in 
Bosnia put in practice their vision of ethnic citizenship – and even voted a law 
on ‘Serb citizenship’ to that effect – applied in ethnically cleansed territories. 
And they were not alone in this kind of enterprise.
Partners into Competitors 113
I agree with Jack Snyder who dismisses explanations centred on the supposedly 
long-term popular nationalist rivalries that precede democratization – often 
a very important feature of the ‘ethnic hatred’ argument. Snyder claims that 
‘before democratization begins, nationalism is usually weak or absent among the 
broad masses of the population. Popular nationalism typically arises during the 
earliest stages of democratization, when elites use nationalist appeals to compete 
for popular support’ (2000: 32). He argues that ‘nationalist conflicts arise as a 
by-product of elites’ efforts to persuade the people to accept divisive nationalist 
ideas’ (32). In this sense, his position is similar to that of V. P. Gagnon who claims 
that the responsibility for igniting nationalism lies solely with the political elites 
who channel nationalist sentiments for their own political and economic benefits 
(2004). Skalnik Leff points out that democratization may segment rather than 
pluralize and liberalization may easily result in authoritarianism and intolerance 
(1999: 211). On the other hand, the veteran scholar of ethnic conflict Donald 
Horowitz notes that divisions and conflicts caused by electoral competition in 
ethnically diverse societies ‘can often be averted by prudent planning of elections 
and territorial arrangements’ (1985: 682).
Neither of these were present in Yugoslavia in 1990. Elections were definitely 
not planned prudently to avoid conflicts. They were organized hastily by the 
republics and with significant time gaps between them, which had serious 
consequences for the political dynamic in Yugoslavia’s final hours. As for the 
territorial arrangements, the internal borders were well established. Nevertheless, 
they began to be openly challenged, first of all by Serbia’s demands for a revision 
of existing ‘AVNOJ’ borders, judged to be ‘artificial’ by mostly Serb, but also 
many Croatian nationalists. Any eventual change of borders, naturally, was 
supposed to happen at the expense of others.
Similar to Horowitz, in their widely quoted 1992 article on ‘political identities 
and electoral sequencing’ Stepan and Linz diagnosed the decisive impact of 
the first democratic elections – their organization (at the national and/or 
regional level), timing and sequencing – on the survival of non-democratic 
multinational polities such as Spain, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. They 
claim, in short, that the ‘sequence of elections per se can help construct or 
dissolve identities’ (2001: 202). The very fact that democratic elections did not 
take place at the federal level in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union prevented 
their legitimatization as states and contributed to their disintegration into 
democratized sub-units. The Spanish case was clearly different. The first 
democratic elections there were organized at the national level and this alone, 
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by virtue of the consequent national electoral competition, consolidated all-
national parties and the Spanish state in spite of its ethnonational and regional 
diversity. Although electoral sequencing heavily influenced the political 
dynamic in Yugoslavia – we will never know, however, if all-Yugoslav elections 
would have saved Yugoslavia as a state – one should not overlook some 
important differences between Stepan and Linz’s various cases, especially 
between highly centralized and unitary post-Franco Spain1 and federalized, to 
different degrees, Yugoslavia and Soviet Union where elections came after an 
initial period of liberalization in the 1980s that allowed republican and local 
elites to capture advantageous positions. It is true that ‘no significant polity 
wide parties emerged’ (Stepan 2004b: 348) in Yugoslavia. One needs to add 
that this happened precisely because the political space, unlike in Spain, was 
institutionally already fragmented. The Yugoslav communists did not pluralize 
their polity, only their own party. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia 
was indeed a league of six parties – or eight parties if we count the independent 
parties from Vojvodina and Kosovo – based in their republics. It easily turned 
regional communist elites into the representatives of their nations in the 
federal arena. The only polity-wide, all-Yugoslav and pro-Yugoslav party in 
Yugoslavia’s history was thus a federalized ‘league’ that disintegrated even 
before the first democratic elections (January 1990). There was a dearth of 
politically significant actors, standing neutrally above ethnonational cleavages 
that could have eventually given rise to new polity-wide parties. The republican 
political elites decided to organize the first democratic elections separately in 
order to ensure their legitimacy and reinforce their positions in anticipation 
of future bargaining over the preservation or disintegration of the Yugoslav 
federation, bargaining that eventually took place in a highly volatile context.
Nevertheless, the timing and sequencing of republican democratic elections 
did play an important role in the electoral preferences of citizens. Slovenia held 
elections only three months after the failed Fourteenth Congress of the LCY. 
These elections brought victory to the centre-right pro-independence coalition, 
but Milan Kučan, a reformed communist, was elected president. Croatia 
completed the electoral process soon after in May 1990. Ivica Račan’s reformed 
communists got 35 per cent of votes but lost heavily – largely due to their 
poor electoral calculation and poorly designed electoral rules – to Tudjman’s 
nationalists who with 42 per cent won an absolute majority in the Parliament. 
The Parliament later elected Franjo Tudjman as President. Then followed a 
huge gap (for such turbulent times) between the elections in the northwestern 
republics and subsequent elections in the southeastern republics, which were 
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finally called in late Autumn 1990. In brief, the democratically elected, mostly 
right-wing republican governments of Slovenia and Croatia co-existed for half a 
year with the old socialist governments in Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro and 
Serbia, the latter two being nationalistic as well.
Already in August 1990 local Serbs in, as it would be proclaimed later, the 
Krajina region of Croatia blocked the roads between two major Croatian cities, 
Zagreb and Split, in open defiance of the new Croatian authorities. A month 
later Serbia adopted a new Constitution confirming the abolition of Vojvodina’s 
and Kosovo’s autonomy but retaining their two seats in the Yugoslav Presidency. 
If Milošević’s bullying clearly handed the advantage to nationalist and separatist 
forces in Slovenia and Croatia, inter-ethnic conflicts in Croatia, in turn, had 
a strong impact on the electoral preferences of Bosnian, Montenegrin and 
Serbian citizens. The nationalist reformed Communists won in Serbia and 
Montenegro, whereas in Bosnia nationalist anti-Communists (Serb, Croat 
and Muslim ethnic parties) formed a coalition with disastrous results for the 
country’s future. Milošević’s Socialist Party of Serbia largely won the elections 
and at the presidential elections Milošević won 65 per cent of the votes. Finally, 
in Macedonia nationalists won in November of 1990 but reformed communist 
Kiro Gligorov was elected president. In sum, conservative nationalist political 
forces triumphed almost everywhere in Yugoslavia even in the guise of ‘socialist 
parties’ such as Milošević’s.
No true left-leaning pan-Yugoslav party made a strong showing at the 
elections. In a belated attempt to fill the vacant spot left by the Yugoslav 
Communists as the only all-Yugoslav supranational political force, the federal 
Prime Minister Ante Marković founded the Alliance of Reform Forces (SRS) in 
July 1990. In spite of his all-Yugoslav popularity for some successful economic 
policies such as the introduction of the convertible dinar and stabilization of 
the prices in early 1990, he entered the political game too late. In addition to 
rampant nationalism, some social costs of his own liberal economic policies and 
austerity measures, as dictated by IMF, could also explain his political defeat: a 
huge number of the unemployed,2 especially outside Slovenia and Croatia, and 
tens of thousands on strike were more likely to look for solutions in their own 
republic and to listen to nationalist arguments that blamed him and his federal 
government or other republics and other ethnic groups for their miserable 
conditions. His party predictably performed well only in highly mixed Bosnian 
urban centres and in Macedonia, two republics whose citizens were well aware 
that they would be the ones to pay a heavy price in the case of Yugoslavia’s 
disintegration.
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A secret handshake between nationalism 
and electoral democracy
In the words of Linz and Stepan, ‘agreements about stateness are prior to 
agreements about democracy’. ‘A “stateness” problem, they argue, may be said 
to exist when a significant proportion of the population does not accept the 
boundaries of the territorial state (whether constituted democratically or not) 
as a legitimate political unit to which they owe obedience’ (Linz and Stepan 
2001 [1992]: 200). This definition, however, needs to be amended. The stateness 
problem can also occur when one or more countries question a particular 
country’s or each other’s stateness and territorial shape. One can also argue that 
the imperative of nation-state building, as the condition for successful integration 
of post-communist states into the democratic family of nations, could produce 
extreme conflicts in states that perceive or create a perception that their stateness 
(in terms of their sheer existence or their borders) is disputed from within or/
and without. There is an apparent conflict between conceptions of a consolidated 
nation-state – which in Eastern Europe usually means an ethnically defined and 
homogenized nation-state – and a state that should provide equal treatment to 
its citizens regardless of their origins and eventually, preferably in diversified 
countries, promote a pluralized democracy and effective minority rights.
Messages sent from the West underscoring the importance of solid stateness 
for successful democratization did not pressure regional actors to redefine or 
reform their ethnically heterogeneous states towards greater pluralism. On the 
contrary, they reinforced the idea that a truly functional state could only be an 
ethnically homogenized nation-state. After all, it is argued, only solid nation-
states successfully democratized and exited communism without violence, 
whereas multinational federations and countries with a significant proportion 
of minorities experienced serious problems, conflicts, violence and a delayed 
democratization. In other words – and this message resonated well among local 
nationalist elites – the issue of minorities could prevent the consolidation of the 
state and even endanger its borders and ultimately its very existence.
As Will Kymlicka points out, the West often sends contradictory demands 
to Eastern Europe by pushing equally hard for the adoption of state models 
developed in monolingual nation-states and for a series of minority rights 
characteristic of multilingual and multination states (Kymlicka 2001a: xiv). 
This ambiguous message presents local leaders with a crucial choice: either they 
continue to build an ethnically consolidated nation-state or they adopt multiple 
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measures to reform their states on a civic and even multinational basis (which 
might include the ‘threat’ of federalization), which they do only under external 
pressure or when facing serious internal rebellion and almost always reluctantly. 
The post-communist states often argue that they need to construct themselves 
as solid nation-states through the process of transition before they can pluralize 
and implement high standard minority rights protections. The false belief that 
under communist rule nation-building was frozen and thus should be defrosted 
as part of the democratic transition is overwhelmingly accepted both on the 
ground and in the West. Hence, a toleration of many controversial policies by 
nationalist democratizing elites such as, for instance, the massive deprivation 
of citizenship of the former Soviet citizens on the grounds of their non-Baltic 
origins in Estonia and Latvia.
But the question remains as to whether democratization can be achieved 
without pluralization. Kymlicka sees a clear correlation between democratization 
and minority nationalism (2001b: 369). The Eastern and Central European 
countries without minorities democratized successfully, he concludes, whereas 
a slow and painful democratization results from the inability to accommodate 
minority nationalism. However, the example he cites as evidence for his claim 
could, contrary to his intentions, support the opposite conclusion. We have here 
another ambiguous message from the West because, once again, the successful 
democratization of an ethnically homogenous country could be perceived by 
other states with minority difficulties as an example to emulate in their own 
attempt to consolidate and democratize. Minorities, therefore, are not seen as 
allowing an opportunity to achieve full democratization through a joint effort, 
as Kymlicka advocates, but rather are considered an obstacle on this path. 
Since almost all countries with minorities have experienced ‘difficulties’ in 
democratization, this simply reinforces the powerful and dangerous stereotype 
that ethnic diversity itself is to blame for the failure. The accommodation of 
minorities’ requests, especially if followed by consociational arrangements, veto 
powers and territorial autonomy, is thus seen as a threat to the functioning and 
even the cohesion of the state. In short, why should they bother to democratize 
by accommodating minorities’ demands, when they can just as easily ‘get rid’ of 
them – either literally or by simply restricting access to citizenship – and thereby 
democratize successfully like the others.
Observers of democratization in countries with a high degree of 
ethnonational plurality often quote (often uncritically) the classic liberal 
authority John Stuart Mill, who claims in his Considerations on Representative 
Government (1861) that ‘free institutions are next to impossible in a country 
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made up of different nationalities’ (296) and that ‘it is in general a necessary 
condition of free institutions, that the boundaries of governments should 
coincide in the main with those of nationalities’ (298–299). According to Philip 
Roeder, the post-communist experience demonstrates that ‘democracy is 
unlikely to survive in ethnically plural societies’ (1999: 855). Roeder is among 
those scholars worried about the ‘third wave of democracy’ and claims to have 
statistical evidence that ‘successful democratic transitions are improbable 
when national revolutions are incomplete’ (1999: 856). Democracy promoters 
thus very often encourage nationalist politicians – although sometimes they 
worry about their human rights records – through their own claims that 
democracy is possible only with a solid ethnic majority, or failing this, a 
peaceful and complacent minority. To insist on ethnic homogeneity as a pre-
condition for liberal democracy in Eastern Europe is essentially to advocate a 
system of ethnically ‘pure’ and separated territories. But to achieve such ethnic 
‘purity’, or at least to reduce ethnic plurality, as demonstrated in the former 
Yugoslavia and in some post-Soviet regions, requires the massive employment 
of non-democratic methods involving statelessness, discrimination, human 
rights violations, violence against civilians, expulsions and, ultimately, mass 
killings. After all, this is exactly how the countries of ‘old Europe’ achieved 
their ethnonational homogeneity and a ‘democratic peace’. This ‘advice’, 
unfortunately, resonated well in post-socialist ‘new Europe’. In multinational 
socialist federations, it promoted ethnically based political communities in 
opposition to the existing civic-legal political communities at the republican 
level as a basis for democracy. This ethnocentric vision of citizenship challenged 
social realities and institutional settings, put in question the existing borders 
and helped to open the door for violence and war.
